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A FOOTNOTE TO THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY"
By MARK DeWOLFE HOWE t
AIR. GRAHA:m'S recent articles in the Yale LaW Journal have done
much to clarify the history and meaning of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not intend to repeat the story he and
others have told, but merely to add a brief footnote to their writings
and to call attention to opinions of Chancellor Kent which seem to have
been overlooked by those who have written on the history of due process
and the position of corporations in our constitutional law.- I believe that
the opinions in themselves are of considerable interest and that they have
the additional importance of being the earliest expression of the attitude
of their author. Certainly Kent's place in American legal history gives
peculiar significance to his constitutional judgments.
The Council of Revision, established by the New York Constitution
of 1777, was composed of the Governor, the Chancellor, and the Justices
of the Supreme Court, or any two of them.' It was provided that "all
bills which have passed the Senate and Assembly shall, before they be-
come laws, be presented to the said Council for their revisal and consider-
ation; and if . . . it should appear improper to the said Council, or a
majority of them, that the said bill should become a law of this State,
that they return the same, together with their objections thereto in
writing, to the Senate or House of Assembly, in whichsoever the same
shall have originated, who shall . . .proceed to reconsider the said bill."'
If two thirds of each house agreed to the passage of the bill, despite the
objections of the Council, it should then become law. The only consti-
tutional statement of policy to guide the Council was the recital in the
preamble that "laws inconsistent with the spirit of this Constitution or
with the public good may be hastily and unadvisedly passed."' The Council
was abolished by the Convention of 1821,0 but during the forty-five years
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of its existence it played an exceedingly important part in the government
of the state,' and in its numerous opinions may be found constitutional
views of extraordinary interest. 8
James Kent was a member of the Council of Revision from 1798
until its abolition,' and, needless to say, took an active part in its work.'
Some day a detailed study of the Council's opinions will be made; at the
present time, however, our concern is only with those opinions which
relate to concepts of due process and to the right of corporations, like
natural persons, to claim constitutional protection. It so happens that
Kent wrote the Council's official opinion in all but one of the cases with
which we are concerned, and we have good evidence as to the share he
had in framing that opinion as well.
In 1804 the New York legislature passed a law concerning the election
of charter officers in the incorporated City of New York." The statute
changed the qualifications of electors, and was passed over the objections
of the Council of Revision' 2 which condemned the act for its failure
to recite either that the parties interested had consented to the alteration
in the charter or that the change was founded on any strong public
necessity. Concluding the Council's objections was the assertion that "it
has been considered as a settled and salutary principle in our government,
that in all cases where the ordinary process of law affords a competent
remedy, charters of incorporation containing grants of personal and
municipal privileges were not to be essentially affected without the con-
sent of the parties concerned."' 3
In Alfred B. Street's collection of the vetoes of the Council of Revision
the editor states that these objections were reported by justice Kent."
The statement seems to be inaccurate. On September 15. 1818, Francis
Brown, President of Dartmouth College, wrote to Daniel Webster con-
cerning a conversation which Brown had recently had with Kent."; While
7. See, in general, 1 LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORy OF NEW YoUK (lf91)
743-749.
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From 1814 until his retirement in 1823 he served as Chancellor of the State.
10. Of the 82 opinions rendered during Kent's membership on the Council, he
appears in Street's volume as the author of 27.
11. Act of April 5, 1804, 3 Laws of N. Y. (Webster) 425.
12. See STREET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 327.
13. Id. at 328 (italics added).
14. Id. at 327.
15. The letter is printed in SHiRLEY, THE DARTMIOUTHZ COLLEGE CAUSES (1879)
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discussing the Dartmouth College case, then pending before the Supreme
Court of the United States,'" Kent had shown Brown his record of the
proceedings of the Council of Revision on the New York Legislature's
Act of 1804. Brown copied portions of the record and sent them to
Vebster. From that record it appears that at a meeting of the Council
on March 31, 1804, the bill was committed to justice Kent by his asso-
ciates. He reported objections which included the following: "It has
been considered and treated as a settled and salutary principle in our
govt. that charters of incor. were not to be essentially affected without
due process of law, or without consent of the parties concerned. Nothing
but a strong publick necessity would justify such an interference."'-, We
do not know what other objections Kent had expressed, but we do know
that his objections were overruled by all the judges"8 and that the governor
was undecided. On April 4 Governor Clinton reported his criticisms of
the same bill, to which all assented except Chief Justice Lewis and Justice
Spencer, who "non-concurred".h The objections reprinted by Street,
and which he ascribed to Kent seem, from this testimony of Kent's,
quoted by Brown, to have been framed by Governor Clinton. It will
be noticed, of course, that the only change of any significance between
the quoted objection of Kent and that of Clinton is that the Justice
used the phrase "due process of law" where the Governor spoke of "or-
dinary process of law". Surely Kent was right when he characterized
the two opinions as "substantially the same".20
16. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819). The case had
been decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire on November 6, 1817. 1 X. H.
111 (1817).
17. SHIRLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 269-270.
18. Id. at 270. In addition to Justice Kent the judges present xwere Chief Juwtic
Lewis, and Justices Livingston, Thompson, and Spencer. It is not unlikely that Kent
stated objections similar to those which he had made to the Act of March 8, 1803, in-
creasing the number of wards in New York City. 3 Laws of N. Y. (\ebster) -225.
Kent had then condemned the law "because, if the alterations contained in the said bill
can be made without the consent of the corporation, the charter may with equal right
be altered in other particulars . . . And not only this, but every other charter, and every
grant from government can be altered or resumed at pleasure, for they all rest upon the
same foundation . . . It involves a principle which may lead to the destruction (f all
the chartered rights and property of the people of this State, for rights and property
cease to be of value when the faith of compact does not secure them, and they are held
at the will of any man or any set of men whomsoever." Despite these objections, Gov-
ernor Clinton and Justices Livingston and Thompson had found the law unobjectionable
and it had accordingly become law. For Kent's objections, see STaRrT, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 423-425; SHiRIEy, op. cit. supra note 15, at 269.
19. SIRiLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 270. Street gives no indication that any mem-
ber of the Council dissented from the objections which were adopted. Id. at 327.
20. Id. at 270. Writing in 1836, Kent ascribed the Council's opinion to Clinton, but
summarized the objections by saying that "it had become a settled and salutary prin-
ciple in the government, that charters of incorporation . . .were not to be essentially
affected without the consent of the parties, or without due process of law" (italics added).
KC-,-r, THE CHARTER OF THE CITy OF NEW YoRr, ITH NomS (1851 reprint) 220.
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In our eyes, accustomed to the doctrines of the Dartmouth College case,
perhaps the most striking aspect of these opinions of Clinton and Kent
is negative-their failure to base their objections on the contract clause
of the Federal Constitution.2 Perhaps Kent and Clinton in using the
phrases "due process of law" and "ordinary process of law" intended
only to refer to general common law principles, but it is not unlikely
that they wished to buttress their general disapproval of the statute with
vague reference to that clause in the Constitution of 1777 which provided
that "no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any
of the Rights or Privileges secured to the Subjects of this State, by this
Constitution, unless by the Law of the Land, or the Judgment of his
Peers",22 or to those clauses in the Act of January 26, 1787, concerning
the Rights of Citizens, which referred to "due process of law".2 1 That
Kent was somewhat uncertain as to the correctness of his own opinion
is indicated by his statement to Francis Brown that "it was to be con-
sidered he made these objns. as a politician, not as a judge; and he was
not clear that the doctrine laid down was correct, as applied to corporations
for the purpose of govt., etc." 24
Another opinion of the Council, delivered in 1807, and this time by
Kent himself, once more indicates that at least as a politician, if not as
a judge, he believed that corporations were entitled to the vague pro-
tection of the "law of the land" clause of the Constitution or the due
process clauses in the statutes of the State. On April 3, 1807, an Act
came before the Council in which the Regents of Columbia College were
21. The tendency in early efforts to provide constitutional protection for corporate
charters was, of course, to appeal first to the due process and law of the land clausesq in
state constitutions and second to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. See
Graham, supra note 1, at (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 172-173. In 1790, however, Governor
Clinton, in objecting to a proposed statute of New York, seemed to consider that cor-
porate charters were contracts which could not constitutionally be impaired, The other
members of the Council did not concur. See STREET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 416.
22. Constitution of 1777, § 13. Very surely Kent knew in 1804 that Coke and others
had identified the Law of the Land clause of Magna Charta with "due process of law."
See 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896) 13.
23. Laws of the 10th Session (2 Jones & Varick) c. 1. Section 2 of the statute pro-
vided that "no Citizens of this State shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
or her Freehold, or liberties, or Free-Custom; or outlawed, or exiled, or condemned, or
otherwise destroyed, but by lawful Judgment of his or her Peers, or by Due Process of
Law." Although the phrase "due process of law" appears also in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th
sections of the same act in each of those sections its reference was specifically to criminal
proceedings. This statute was given a position of importance comparable to that of the
Constitution. See Chancellor Kent, in Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.
162, 165-166 (N. Y. 1816) and his opinion of October 24, 1814, for the Council of Rcvi-
sion, in STREET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 377-378.
24. SHIRLEY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 269. For a lively account of the political back-
ground of the statute, see PO11ERANTZ,--NEw YORK, AN AMERICAN CITY-1783-1803
(1938) 133-146.
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given the power, previously possessed by the Trustees, of filling vacancies
in the Board of Trustees. -5 In objecting to the statute, Kent stated that
the corporation had been given a "privilege and immunity" in its charter
of 1754, and that the College had not consented to the proposed change.
Finally, he asserted that "it is a sound principle in free governments
• . . that charters of incorporation, whether granted for private or local,
or charitable, or literary or religious purposes, were not to be affected
without due process of law, or without the consent of the parties con-
cerned". 20 He again acknowledged that "legislative interference would
be justified by some strong public necessity", but he denied that any such
necessity existed in this case. The Assembly refused to pass the Bill over
the Council's objection and it did not become law.27
Upon the basis of these two opinions it does not seem rash to assert
that Kent believed that corporate rights could not constitutionally be
altered without due process of law -in other words, without proper
proceedings in a court of law. -8 In any case, these previously neglected
opinions are of importance and interest as signifying an early effort to
make use of the general concept of due process as a protection to cor-
porate interests. The case of Trustees of the University of North Carolina
v. Foy,"- decided in 1804,'0 may still be considered the earliest instance
in which due process of law was explicitly applied in such a way as to
give constitutional protection to vested corporate rights, but it seems
almost unquestionable that Kent at approximately the same time was
reaching a similar result by a strikingly similar method. Later on, to
be sure, he found other ways of giving security to vested rights," but
history has shown us that his early suggestions on the Council of Re-
vision, whether political or judicial in character, contained enormous
possibilities of growth.
Two other opinions of the Council of Revision, one written in 1806,
the other in 1807, are deserving of particular mention. In 1806 a statute
was passed by which turnpike commissioners were authorized to order
the opening of the toll gate on any road which they judged to be out of
25. See STREET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 344. Governor Lewis and Justice Thompson
concurred. Concerning this bill, see Van Amringe, in A HisTior, OF CqI.TLuDIA UJavn-
SITY (1904) 85-86.
26. Id. at 345 (italics added).
27. It is surprising that in his discussion of the Dartmouth Co'lege Case with Fran-
cis Brown, Kent made no reference to this opinion of the Council's concerning the charter
of Columbia College (no mention of it appears in Shirley's volume).
28. Cf. the opinion of Justice Woodworth, March 22, 1821, in STrPEr, op. cit. mupra
note 8, at 394. See also, Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 146 (N. Y. 1843).
29. 2 Hayw. 310 (N. C. 1804).
30. The same case, as reported in 1 Murph. 58 (N. C. 1805), is there included
among the decisions of the June Term, 1805.
31. See, Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 499 (N. Y. 1811); Gardner v. Village
of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N. Y. 1816).
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repair.32 Kent found the law to be objectionable in its failure to afford
"any guide or limitation to the judgment of the commissioners" or to
give to the proprietors of the turnpike an opportunity to be heard or to
appeal from the decision of the commissioners. 33 The bill, he said, "vests
in these commissioners an arbitrary power over the interest and property
of individuals, . . . for the rights vested in the stockholders of a turn-
pike company, incorporated by law, are as sacred and as much entitled
to protection as any other private rights, and the stockholders cannot
constitutionally be deprived of them by the mere allegation of a forfeiture,
without a trial and conviction of such forfeiture in the ordinary course
of justice."34 Here, of course, Kent was concerned with matters of pro-
cedure and not with vested rights, but it is not improbable that he was
again thinking of due process of law when he spoke of "the ordinary
course of justice". The special importance of the opinion, however, is
the method by which the rights of the corporations were now made
secure. In the other opinions which I have mentioned Kent gave the
municipal and educational corporations themselves direct protection; here
the private corporations achieved security derivatively, through the rights
of their stockholders.
The last opinion to which I shall refer does not touch upon the con-
cept of due process, but is of equal interest with those which did. On
April 6, 1807, there came before the Council for its consideration "An
Act to restrain Insurance of Lottery Tickets, and for Other Purposes."3
In its last section the bill declared it to be unlawful "for any company
not incorporated by the laws of this State, or of the United States, or
any private individual not residing within this State, to set up and keep
within this State, by their agent, or otherwise, any office to insure houses
or goods against fire, or vessels or merchandise against maritime losses,
and that every such insurance shall be void, and every person receiving
any premium therefor shall forfeit double the amount." 3 Kent again
wrote the opinion of the Council and condemned the bill as inconsistent
with the spirit of the Constitution and the public good. The Assembly
refused to pass the bill over the Council's objections. The Chief Justice
found the act to be a violation of "the second secton of the fourth
article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that 'the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states'. This intercommunity of privilege," said
32. Act of April 7, 1806, 4 Laws of N. Y. (Webster) 600.
33. See STREzr, op. cit. supra note 8, at 338. Governor Lewis and Justices Thompson
and Spencer concurred.
34. Id. at 339.
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id. at 346. I quote from the Council's summary of the objectionable portion of
the bill, not from the bill itself which I believe is not in existence. Governor Lewis and
Justice Thompson concurred with the Chief Justice.
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Kent, "secured to the citizens of the several States applies to their per-
sonal rights and immunities, and among others to the free right to
exercise trade and commerce." 37 ie said, further, that "if the bill had
prohibited all insurance ly private individuals or companies, by means
of agents, whether the individuals or companies did or did not reside
within this State, then there would have been an equality between the
civil immunities of the citizens of this and the other States, and the
present objection would not have applied." 3s In addition he found the
proposed act to be repugnant to the general good as tending to encourage
monopoly and to discourage competition.39
The bill itself has interest as an indication of the early date at which
the legislature was endeavoring to throw around the insurance business
a protective franchise.40 The basis upon which Kent condemned the
legislation is, however, of more importance. In 1807 the meaning of
the privileges and immunities clause was still uncertain; the effort to
apply its provisions to corporate privileges had not begun."1 Kent, how-
ever, with placid assurance held not only that "the free right to exercise
trade and commerce" is a privilege of state citizenship, 4- but extended
this privilege to foreign corporations. It is possible, of course, that his
condemnation of the law was based upon its effect on non-resident
individuals and stockholders who wanted to engage in the insurance
business in New York. His broad language, however, seems to include
corporations among the citizens to whom protection was afforded. Had
Kent been pressed to elucidate his opinion he might well have said that
it was to the rights of non-resident stockholders in foreign corporations,
rather than to the corporations themselves that he was giving consti-
tutional security. Certainly the grounds upon which he had condemned
the act concerning turnpikes would have supported such an explanation
of his later opinion.
So far as I know, the views of Chancellor Kent in these various opinions
were never brought to the attention of those courts which were later
presented with similar problems. Perhaps in all of the opinions to which
I have referred Kent was speaking more as a politician than as a judge.
37. Ibid. Although the Council's express authority might seem to he limited to the
disapproval of bills which were felt to violate the spirit of the State Constitution, there
seemed never to be any hesitation in condemning legislation as being inconsistent wvith the
Federal Constitution. See opinions in STREET, op. cit. supra note 8, at M90, 318, 333,
377, and 399.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 347.
40. HENDRMSO, op. cit. supra note 2, at 101-102, mentions statutes of a similar sort,
but refers to none as early as this.
41. See Graham, supra note 1, at (1938) 48 Y.%LE L. J. 171, 175 ct scq.
42. Cf. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3230 (E. D. Pa. 187J). 'Mr. Justice
Vashington there included the "right to trade" among the privileges and immunities of
citizenship.
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Courts which were anxious to find some handy constitutional formula
for the protection of vested rights might, however, have taken the justice's
utterances to be judicial pronouncements. No one can say surely what
effect his opinions might have had on other judges, but it is certain that
the weight of his reputation would have done much to render his views
acceptable. For us, in any case, it is of interest to know that Kent was
making effective though perhaps experimental use of due process con-
cepts in behalf of corporations at a time when the full scope of those
concepts was scarcely suspected. Moreover, he was probably the first
judge to announce that corporations might directly or derivatively obtain
the benefits of the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.
